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BIAS, CORRUPTION & OBSTRUCTION,
OH MY!: THE DUE PROCESS "SHOCKS THE
CONSCIENCE" LIMIT ON INVESTIGATIVE &
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Elizabeth PriceFoley*
ABSTRACT
Due process guarantees the government will not exercise its power in a
manner falling below the standard of civilized decency. Under Supreme Court
precedent, behavior by government officials, including prosecutors and
investigators, that objectively may be characterized as outrageous, arbitrary,
capricious, biased, vindictive, or conscience shocking violates due process.
Whether officials' behavior crosses the constitutional threshold requires an
assessment of the totality of the circumstances and is, accordingly, a factually
sensitive inquiry.
Facts disinterred thus far suggest that the "collusion" narrative-alleging
that Russia and Donald Trump's campaign colluded to throw the 2016
presidentialelection-may have a corruptorpolitically biasedgenesis. As thefacts
continue to unfold, the depth and breadth of bias against Trump by Executive
Branch officials, including those at the FBIand DOJ,may well rise to conscienceshocking levels. The taint of antecedent corruption or bias, in turn, could infect
the prosecutorialeffort of Special Counsel Robert Mueller.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"The time to guard against corruptionand tyranny, is before they shall
have gotten hold of us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than
to trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have entered."
Thomas Jefferson 1
Most of us have never seriously entertained the notion that our
"constitutional democracy" 2 is endangered. We assume "corruption" is
mostly a second-world or third-world problem. We assume our Constitution,
with its elaborate checks and balances, will prevent any deep corruption
from taking root.
But in recent years, the United States' constitutional regime seems to
have entered a new era of stress testing in which corruption has sprouted like
weeds. Americans' identities and private conversations have been unmasked
at alarming rates by high-ranking Executive Branch officials.3 Politically
powerful people have been permitted to destroy potential evidence 4 and
have been cleared of crimes before investigations were concluded. 5 FBI
investigators in field offices around the country may have been told by
higher-ups in D.C. to stand down on investigations of pay-to-play behavior
1.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES

ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA,

Q.XIII (1781),

https://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/jefferson/jefferson.html.

2. We of course have a constitutional "republic," not a constitutional democracy,
but the latter is the more popularly used colloquial expression and the stated topic of
this symposium.
3.
Illegal

See Andrew C. McCarthy, Explosive Revelation of Obama Administration
Surveillance
of
Americans,
NAT'L
REV.
(May
25,
2017),

https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/05/nsa-illegal-surveiflance-americans-obamaadministration-abuse-fisa-court-response/; Katie Bo Williams, NSA GrantedNearly 2K
'Unmasking' Requests in 2016, HILL (May 2, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-

security/331642-nsa-granted-2k-unmasking-requests-in-2016-report.
4. See, e.g., FBI Agreed to Destroy Laptops of Clinton Aides with Immunity Deal,
Lawmaker Says, FOX NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
206/1/03/fbi-agreed-to-destroy-immunized-clinton-aides-aptops-sources-say.html;
Louis Nelson, Gowdy: Clinton Used Special Tool to Wipe Email Server, POLITICO
(Aug.
25,
2016),
https://www.politico.con/story/2016/08/hillary-clinton-emails-

bleachbit-227425.
5. See Letter from Charles E.Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
& Lindsey 0. Graham, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism, Senate Comm. on
the
Judiciary,
to Christopher
Wray,
Dir.,
FBI (Aug.
30, 2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-08-30%20CEG %20+%20LG %
20to%20FBI% 20(Comey%20Statement).pdf.

2018]

Limit on Investigative & ProsecutorialConduct

by the former Secretary of State. 6 Political-opposition research may have
been used pretextually to launch an FBI investigation of an ongoing
presidential campaign. 7 Investigators and Department of Justice (DOJ)
lawyers appear to have made material misrepresentations to courts in order
to obtain warrants to spy on individuals connected to an ongoing presidential
campaign. I High-ranking law-enforcement personnel have held overtly
partisan views9 and schemed to devise an "insurance policy"'10 to "stop"" a
presidential candidate that they despised. High-ranking officials have
repeatedly lied (both to Congress and to Inspectors General) 12 and resisted
congressional subpoenas, 13 frustrating the ability to disinter the extent of
6. See Devlin Barrett, FBI in InternalFeud over Hillary Clinton Probe, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/laptop-may-include-thousands-ofemails-linked-to-hillary-clintons-private-server-1477854957 ("Others further down the
FBI chain of command, however, said agents were given a much starker instruction on
the case: 'Stand down.' When agents questioned why they weren't allowed to take more
aggressive steps, they said they were told the order had come from the deputy director
-Mr. McCabe. Others familiar with the matter deny Mr. McCabe or any other senior
FBI official gave such a stand-down instruction.").
7. See generally Letter from Donald F. McGahn, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Devin Nunes, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence (Feb. 2, 2018), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/memo-and_
white housejletter.pdf.
8. See generally id.
9. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW
OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE

2016

ELECTION

171 (2018) [hereinafter IG Report],

https://www.j ustice.gov/file/1071991/download.
10. See Chuck Ross, 'We Can't Take That Risk'-FBI Officials Discussed 'Insurance
2017),
(Dec.
13,
CALLER
Trump Presidency, DAILY
Policy' Against
http://dailycaller.com/2017/12/13/fbi-officials-discussed-insurance-policy-against-trumppresidency/.
11. See Michael S. Schmidt, Top Agent Said F.B.I. Would Stop Trump from
Becoming President, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/14/us/politics/fbi-texts-trump.html.
12. See Adam Goldman & Nicholas Fandos, Former F.B.L Deputy Director Is
Faulted in Scathing Inspector General Report, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/us/politics/former-fbi-deputy-director-is-faultedin-scathing-inspector-general-report.html; Pete Kasperowicz, 'Growing Body of
Evidence' James Comey Lied to Congress, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.comlnews/growing-evidence-that-james-comey-liedto-congress-says-mark-meadows.
13 Samuel Chamberlain, Lisa Page Will Not Appear for Capitol Hill Interview
Despite Subpoena, Attorney Says, FOX NEWS NETWORK (July 10, 2018),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/07/10/lisa-page-will-not-appear-for-capitol-hill-
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their miscreant behavior. 14 Prosecutors have initiated raids of homes and
office' 5-and even raided lawyers' offices 6-to investigate crimes with no
17
relation to their original mandate.
Such behavior by Executive Branch officials must give us pause,
regardless of which side of the political aisle we are on. No one-whether
Republican or Democrat or Independent-should think such behavior is
acceptable. And I doubt anyone does. But whatever one's political
affiliation, those of good faith agree that we ought to continue to investigate
in order to ascertain the full extent of corruption.
The recently issued report of the DOJ Inspector General (IG) has
confirmed alarming evidence of bias by the highest-ranking lawenforcement officials of the federal government in conducting an electionyear investigation of Hillary Clinton, the 2016 Democratic nominee for
President, regarding her mishandling of classified information while serving
as Secretary of State. 18 Communications between officials leading the
Clinton investigation "reflected political opinions in support of former
Secretary Clinton and against her then political opponent, Donald Trump.
Some of these text messages and instant messages mixed political
commentary with discussions about the Midyear investigation, and raised
concerns that political bias may have impacted investigative decisions."19
Indeed, the ubiquity of such political commentary among high-ranking FBI
and DOJ officials led the IG to conclude:

interview-despite-subpoena-attorney-says.html.
14. See id.

15. See Carol D. Leonnig, Tom Hamburger & Rosalind S. Helderman, FBI
Conducted Raid of Former Trump Campaign ChairmanManafort's Home, WASH. POST

(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-conducted-predawn-raidof-former-trump-campaign-chairman-manaforts-home/2017/08/09/5879fa9c-7c45-1 le79d08-b79f191668ed-story.html?utmterm=.968885f51282.
16. See Erica Orden, Rebecca Ballhaus & Michael Rothfeld, Agents Raid Office of
Trump Lawyer Michael Cohen in Connection with Stormy Daniels Payments, WALL ST.

J. (Apr. 9,
1523306297.

2018),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-raids-trump-lawyers-office-

17. See Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Questions Whether Mueller Has Overstepped His
Authority on Manafort, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/

04/us/mueller-authority-paul-manafort-case-judge.html.
18. See generally Goldman & Fandos, supra note 12.
19. See IG Report, supra note 9, at iii.

Limit on Investigative & ProsecutorialConduct

2018]

[T]he conduct by these employees cast a cloud over the FBI Midyear
investigation and sowed doubt the FBI's work on, and its handling of,
the Midyear investigation. Moreover, the damage caused by their
actions extends far beyond the scope of the Midyear investigation and
FBI's reputation for neutral factfinding and
goes to the heart of the
20
political independence.
Indeed, according to the IG, some of the high-ranking officials' private
communications were "not only indicative of a biased state of mind but, even
official action to impact a
more seriously, implie[d] a willingness to take
'21
presidential candidate's electoral prospects.
The IG's report notably adds that "most of the text messages raising
such questions pertained to the Russia investigation" involving that
country's alleged "collusion" with that presidential campaign of Donald
Trump. 22 Given how biases ineluctably shape behavior, the facts uncovered
in the IG report create the impression that a group of high-ranking lawenforcement officials may have acted to squelch the Clinton investigation,
to build a narrative of Trump-Russia collusion in the hopes of bolstering
Mrs. Clinton's electoral chances, and, if the unthinkable happened, to obtain
an insurance policy to cripple the Trump Administration with accusations of
illegitimacy. Federal law enforcement, in other words, may have been
weaponized for purposes of affecting the 2016 presidential election.
If the wolf of corruption did enter the fold of high-level federal law
enforcement during the 2016 presidential election, how can it be rooted out?
Specifically, what existing legal remedies may be available to prevent such
corrupt officials from feasting on the fruit of their behavior? These questions
will be explored in the next Part.
II. REMEDIES FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH CORRUPTION

A. The ConstitutionalPower to Fire Subordinates
The primary constitutional check against Executive Branch corruption
is the President's authority to fire his subordinates, a power the Supreme
Court has concluded "is incident to the power of appointment '23 found in

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at xi, 420.
Id. at xii, 420-21.
Id. at iii, 420.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926).
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the Appointments Clause.24 The Executive Branch is not a "fourth branch" 25
of government; it is the second branch, a manifestation of power granted to
the President-and the President alone-in Article II of the Constitution. In
the words of the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States, the Executive
Branch is the "alter ego" of the President.26 The Executive Branch is not
"independent" of the President; it is the President. 27
The Supreme Court has made clear that a key aspect of separation of
powers is that the President "must place in each member of his official
family, and his chief executive subordinates, implicit faith. The moment that
he loses confidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any
one of them, he must have the power to remove him without delay." 28 You
would never know this if you picked up a newspaper or watched television
29
last May when the President fired the then-FBI Director James Comey.
Cries of "obstruction of justice" were immediately levied by formerly sober
individuals. 0 As the next sub-Part will show, however, those who accuse the
President of obstruction are making political, not legal, arguments.

24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have power... [to] nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint.., all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.").
25. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant
legal trend of the last century .... They have become a veritable fourth branch of the
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept
of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking." (citation omitted)).
26. Myers, 272 U.S. at 133.
27. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483
(2010) (quoting 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799, at 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)) ("In light of
'[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of the
State,' the Constitution provides for executive officers to 'assist the supreme Magistrate
in discharging the duties of his trust."').
28. Myers, 272 U.S. at 134.
29. See Dahlia Lithwick, How the President Obstructed Justice, SLATE (May 13,
2017),
http://www.slate.comlarticles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2017/05/did_
presidentjtrump-obstruct-justice in firingjames-comey.html.
30. See id.; Maia Davis, There's "Absolutely Evidence" to Begin Obstruction of
Justice Case on Trump: Bharara,ABC NEWS (June 11, 2017), https://abcnews.go.coml
Politics/absolutely-evidence-begin-obstruction-justice-case-bhararastory?id=47958033.
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1. Obstructionof Justice Statutes
Constitutional law is supreme to statutory law. 3 1 A President who
exercises his superior constitutional authority to fire a subordinate cannot
be prosecuted for violation of a legally inferior obstruction of justice
statute.32 This does not mean the President is "above the law"; it simply
means, when exercising his constitutional authority, the President is the law,
acting pursuant to the highest law of the land. A statute cannot stand in the
way of the Constitution.
Beyond the mere act of firing, however, President Trump's remarks to
Mr. Comey, prior to his termination, likewise cannot constitute an
obstruction of justice. According to a memo to file penned by James Comey
dated February 14, 2017, President Trump told Comey:
Flynn is a good guy, and has been through a lot. He misled the Vice
President but he didn't do anything wrong in the call [to Russian
Ambassador Kislyak while incoming National Security Advisor]. He
go, to letting
said, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this
33
Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go."
As I have repeatedly pointed out, a fundamental precept of obstruction
statutes is that the defendant's actions must obstruct a "proceeding"
of government, such as a court or congressional proceeding. 34 More
31. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
32. See Anna Giaritelli, Alan Dershowitz: 'You Cannot Charge a President with
Obstruction of Justicefor ExercisingHis ConstitutionalPower',WASH. EXAMINER (Dec.
4, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alan-dershowitz-you-cannot-charge-apresident-with-obstruction-of-justice-for-exercising-his-constitutional-power; David B.
Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Can a President Obstruct Justice?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10,

2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-president-obstruct-j ustice-1512938781?share

Token=st43b2cfc7e8824c63924afbbf9be2Oa7e&reflink= article emailshare.
33. See Memorandum from James Comey, Dir., FBI, to File of James Comey, Dir.,
FBI (Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Comey Memo.], https://www.scribd.com/document/
Common
376858614/c2018-4-19-Comey-Memo-Enclosure-Unclassified#fromembed.
reporting indicates the call was with Russian Ambassador Kislyak. See, e.g., Eugene
Kiely, Michael Flynn's Russia Timeline, FACTCHECK.ORG (Dec. 1, 2017),
http://www.factcheck.org/2017/12/Michael-flynns-russia-timeline/.
34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2012); Elizabeth Price Foley, Opinion, Those Who
Tout Trump's 'Obstruction' Misrepresentthe Concept, HILL (June 11, 2018) [hereinafter
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specifically, to constitute obstruction of justice, the defendant's act must be
undertaken with a culpable mindset (mens rea), and it must actually obstruct,
or attempt to obstruct, an official government proceeding.35 Put simply, one
cannot obstruct justice if there is no government proceeding that one is
trying to obstruct. 36
For example, imagine Bob shreds a bunch of documents (a rather
common practice). Shredding documents, without more, is not obstruction
of justice. If there is no pending or reasonably foreseeable government
proceeding to which Bob's documents may be relevant, Bob has not
obstructed justice. Moreover, even if there is a governmental proceeding,
Bob does not obstruct justice unless he shreds his documents with the
requisite mens rea.37
Several obstruction statutes have been invoked in an attempt to make
the case against President Trump. For example, some argue 38 the President's
remarks violated § 1505 of Title 18, which declares that anyone who
"corruptly" endeavors to obstruct the proper administration of law "under
which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency
of the United States" is guilty of a felony.3 9 Even putting aside the difficulty
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that President Trump's brief and
generalized words evince a corrupt mindset, 4° § 1505 applies only to a
4
pending proceeding. '

Foley, Those Who Tout], http://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/391348-those-whotout-trumps-obstruction-misrepresent-the-concept; Elizabeth Price Foley, Opinion,
Trump's Statements Are Not an Obstruction of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/opinion/trumps-fbi-comey-statements-are-not-anobstruction-of-justice.html.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing
the varying degrees of mens rea required for different obstruction statutes and the fact
that § 1510 requires a "willful" and not merely "knowing" act as an element of the crime).

36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
37. See Foley, Those Who Tout, supra note 34.
38. See, e.g., David French, Donald Trump Is Not ConstitutionallyImmune from an
Obstruction
of
Justice
Charge,
NAT'L
REV.
(Dec.
4,
2017),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/donald-trump-not-constitutionally-immuneobstruction-justice-charge/.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
40. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (defining
a corrupt mindset as "wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil").
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
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Courts interpreting § 1505's pending proceeding language have
uniformly concluded that it refers to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings by
administrative agencies, but not to an FBI investigation.4 2 The legislative
history of § 1505 suggests Congress did not intend it to reach FBI
investigations, with the House Judiciary Committee report declaring that
"attempts to obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before a proceeding
has been initiated are not within the proscription" of § 1505. 43 Those hoping
to prosecute President Trump for obstruction based upon his statements to
Mr. Comey thus cannot rely on § 1505.
Indeed, only one federal statute criminalizes obstruction with an
ongoing criminal investigation. It is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1510, titled
"Obstruction of Criminal Investigations," and it states:
Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay,
or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of

any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal
investigator shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. 44
As the italicized portions of § 1510 indicate, the statute deems as
"obstruction": (1) a willful act (2) that obstructs/delays/prevents
communication of information about a federal crime to a criminal
investigator and (3) which is accomplished by means of bribery. The statute
is designed to punish those who bribe witnesses to be quiet and not
cooperate with federal investigators, thereby obstructing an ongoing
criminal investigation. 45 It is purposefully narrow because of the nature of
criminal investigations and what criminal defense attorneys say and do on a
daily basis. 46 If saying something to an FBI investigator (or even the FBI
Director) akin to "Bob is a good guy; I hope you'll let Bob go" 4 7 constituted
42. United States v. McDaniel, No. 2:12-CR-0028-RWS-JCF, 2013 WL 3993983, at
*5- (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2013); United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453,454-56 (W.D.
Ky. 1981); see also United States v. Wright, 704 F. Supp. 613, 614-15 (D. Md. 1989)
(finding that § 1505 applies only to a proceeding before an agency with rulemaking or
adjudicative power, not purely investigative power).
43. H.R. REP. No. 90-658, at 1 (1967), as reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1760, 1760
(emphasis added).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 470 F.2d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1973).
46. See, e.g., United States v. San Martin, 515 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. According to a memo to file penned by James Comey dated February 14, 2017,
President Trump told Comey, "[T]hat Flynn is a good guy, and has been through a lot.
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obstruction of justice, every criminal defense attorney in the country would
be guilty of obstruction. Telling an FBI investigator (even the FBI Director)
that Michael Flynn is a "good guy" and expressing hope that the FBI will
drop its investigation neither constitutes an act of bribery (element three)
nor obstructs/delays/prevents communication of information about a federal
crime (element two). 48 The attempt to pin obstruction of justice charges on
President Trump's comments to Mr. Comey, therefore, cannot rest on the
narrow Obstruction of Criminal Investigations statute, § 1510.49
Those pushing the obstruction narrative have recently shifted their
attention to a broader obstruction statute, § 1512 of Title 18.50 Some
argue 5' that the President's statements to Mr. Comey violate subsection (b)
of § 1512, which addresses acts of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion,
or misleading conduct, 52 because he "threatened" or tried to "intimidate"
He misled the Vice President but he didn't do anything wrong in the call [to Russian
Ambassador Kislyak while incoming National Security Advisor]. He said, 'I hope you
can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you
can let this go.'" See Comey Memo., supra note 33.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1510.
49. See id.
50. Id. § 1512.
51. See Tim Hains, Rep. Brad Sherman: Donald Trump Is Guilty of Obstruction of
Justice, REALCLEARPOLITICS (July 12, 2017), https://www.realclearpolitics.com!video/
2017/07/12/rep-bradshermandonald_trumpis-guilty-of obstruction-ofjustice.html.
52. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) reads as follows:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades
another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward
another person, with intent to(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,
from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or
to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding;
or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been
summoned by legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement
officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission
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Comey by stating that he hoped the FBI would let Mr. Flynn go.
But Trump's remarks do not constitute a "threat" or "intimidation"
punishable consistent with the First Amendment. In Virginia v. Black, the
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment permits
criminalization only of "true threats," which are defined as "a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. 5' 3 The Black
Court made clear "[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense
of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm or death." 54 No matter how capaciously one views President
Trump's statements to Mr. Comey, it is clear from Mr. Comey's own
memorandum to file memorializing his 55meeting with the President that he
was not in fear of bodily harm or death.
Others argue that subsection (c) of § 1512 provides a basis for
obstruction charges against President Trump. 56 This subsection defines
obstruction as the alteration or concealment of documents and other objects
used in an "official proceeding," and more broadly, any other act that
obstructs, influences, or impedes such a proceeding. 57 But Congress imposed
higher mens rea under subsection (c), requiring proof that the defendant
acted corruptly, which the Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States defined as "wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. ' 58 A defendant must
know, therefore, that he is interfering with an official proceeding and
must have the specific, evil desire to do so.59 There is no evidence President
Trump did this.

or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of
probation supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
53. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
54. Id. at 360.
55. Compare id., with Comey Memo., supra note 33.
56. See, e.g., Randall Eliason, Did PresidentTrump ObstructJustice? A Prosecution
Analysis, SIDEBARSBLOG.COM (May 15, 2017), https://sidebarsblog.com/did-presidenttrump-obstruct-justice/ (noting the high-profile convictions of President George W.
Bush official "Scooter" Libby and celebrity homemaker Martha Stewart were obtained
with obstructionist charges, though the ultimate investigation yielded no more

substantive wrongdoing).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).
58. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005).

59. See id.
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Section 1512's attractiveness as an alternative to §§ 1505 and 1510 is
likely due to its language in subsection (f), which has been misconstrued by
some as dispensing with the official proceeding requirement of obstruction
law. 60 More specifically, subsection (f) declares, "an official proceeding need
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. ' 61 This
language does not, however, eliminate the need to prove obstruction with an
official proceeding. 62 There must still be an official proceeding that the
defendant is corruptly trying to obstruct, though the official proceeding need
63
not be pending at the time the defendant acted.
The Supreme Court recently made this clear in Marinello v. United
States, a prosecution under an IRS obstruction statute that contained no
official proceeding language. 64 The statute broadly criminalized "corruptly
or by force ... obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or
impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code]. 65
Despite the absence of any official proceeding language in the IRS
obstruction statute, the Marinello Court insisted that the Government prove
the defendant intended to obstruct an official proceeding, declaring, "[T]he
Government must show (among other things) that there is a 'nexus' between
the defendant's conduct and a particular [IRS] proceeding .... "66 The Court
further clarified that the official proceeding must be "pending at the time the
defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. '67 In other words, said the Court,
"the proceeding must at least be in the offing" at the time the defendant
68
acted.

60. See The Trump Lawyers' Confidential Memo to Mueller, Explained,
N.Y. TIMEs, at n.22 (June 2, 2018) [hereinafter Lawyers' Confidential Memo.:
Explained],
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/02/us/politics/trump-legaldocuments.html#footnote-0-22 (asserting that § 1512 "criminalizes the corrupt impeding
of proceedings even if they have not yet started-like the potential grand jury
investigation an F.B.I. case can prompt").
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (emphasis added).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1109-10 (2018).
65. See id. at 1105 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)).
66. Id. at 1109-10.
67. Id. at 1110.
68. Id.
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Pursuant to Marinello, therefore, an obstruction defendant must
impede an official proceeding-either already ongoing or reasonably
foreseeable-even if the obstruction statute under which he is charged omits
official proceeding language. 69 This is logical: Without an official proceeding
requirement, obstruction laws would be breathtakingly broad. 70 Without a
nexus requirement, the Court observed, the IRS obstruction statute under
which Mr. Marinello was charged could "apply to a person who pays a
babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes, leaves a large
cash tip in a restaurant, fails to keep donation receipts from every charity to
which he or she contributes, or fails to provide every record to an
accountant" since such acts colloquially obstruct the IRS's ability to collect
71
taxes.
President Trump's remarks to Mr. Comey did not impede an official
proceeding, which-unlike the obstruction statute in Marinello-is expressly
required by § 1512(c). 72 Moreover, official proceeding is defined in § 1515 of
Title 18 as a proceeding involving a federal court or grand jury, Congress, a
federal agency, or an insurance regulatory agency. 73 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled in United States v.
a proceeding before a federal
Ermoian that an FBI investigation is not
74
agency for purposes of § 1512 obstruction.
But what about the Flynn grand jury? Some argue President Trump's
remarks to Mr. Comey impeded the Flynn grand jury, 75 which is explicitly
included within the definition of official proceeding in § 1515. 76 But
expressing hope that the FBI would let Mr. Flynn go could not, by definition,
obstruct the grand jury investigating Mr. Flynn or any court or grand jury
proceeding for two reasons. First, there is no evidence that a grand jury was
in the offing at the time the President spoke to Comey. 77 Grand juries are
secret, and Flynn told the White House that the FBI had cleared him. 7
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 1113 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1108 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1106, 1108.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2012).
Id. § 1515(a)(1).
United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1169-72 (9th Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., Eliason, supra note 56.

76. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A).
77. See Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).
78. See Byron York, Trump Lawyers Reveal Previously Unknown Evidence in
Flynn Case, WASH. EXAMINER (June 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/

800

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 66

Moreover, according to a memo to file penned by White House Counsel
Donald McGahn on January 27, 2017, acting Attorney General Sally
79
Yates refused to confirm the existence of any investigation into Mr. Flynn.
It appears, therefore, that when President Trump made his statement to Mr.
Comey on February 14, 2017, he had no reason to believe there was a Flynn
grand jury in the offing.80
Second and more fundamentally, even if the President knew or had
reason to know of the existence of a grand jury investigation of Mr. Flynn at
the time he made his remarks to Mr. Comey, the President's comments could
not obstruct the grand jury in any way. The FBI has zero jurisdiction over
grand juries. 81 The FBI's job is to investigate potential crimes and, if
news/newly-leaked-memo-previously-unknown-evidence-michael-flynn-case
("A newly-leaked January 29 memo from President Trump's first legal team to special
counsel Robert Mueller suggests the president believed fired national security adviser
Michael Flynn was no longer under investigation when he famously asked FBI Director
James Comey-by Comey's account-to let the Flynn case go.").
79. The letter to Mueller states the following:
On January 27, 2017, at Mr. McGahn's request, Ms. Yates and Mr. McGahn
had another meeting. Importantly, DOJ leadership declined to confirm to the
White House that Lt. Gen. Flynn was under any type of investigation. According
to Mr. McGahn's memo:
During the meeting, McGahn sought clarification regarding Yates's
prior statements regarding Flynn's contact with Ambassador Kislyak.
Among the issues discussed was whether dismissal of Flynn by the
President would compromise any ongoing investigations. Yates was
unwilling to confirm or deny that there was an ongoing investigation
but did indicate that the DOJ would not object to the White House
taking action against Flynn. (Emphasis added.)
Further supporting the White House's understanding that there was no FBI
investigation that could conceivably have been impeded, "Yates also indicated
that the DOJ would not object to the White House disclosing how the DOJ
obtained the information relayed to the White House regarding Flynn's calls
with Ambassador Kislyak." In other words, the DOJ expressed that the White
House could make public that Lt. Gen. Flynn's calls with Ambassador Kislyak
had been surveilled. It seems quite unlikely that if an ongoing DOJ
investigation of Lt. Gen. Flynn was underway, the DOJ would approve its key
investigation methods and sources being publicized.
Lawyers' ConfidentialMemo.: Explained, supra note 60.
80. See id.
81. See A Brief Description of the Federal Criminal Justice Process, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/resources/victim-services/a-brief-description-of-the-federal-
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warranted by evidence, recommend prosecution to the Department of
Justice. The Department of Justice, not the FBI, has sole discretion to
initiate prosecutions, including empaneling grand juries. 82 Expressing hope
that Comey would let Flynn go could no more obstruct the Flynn grand jury
than telling the Secretary of Agriculture.
B. Due Process as a Remedy for Executive Branch Bias and Corruption
So why do so many otherwise intelligent people perpetuate the claim
that President Trump's firing of, or remarks to, Mr. Comey constituted
obstruction of justice? Because they are playing a political game, not a legal
one. By turning up the rhetoric, they are hoping to lay the foundation for
impeachment should the President have the gall to exercise his constitutional
83
authority.
Such rhetoric makes it toxic for a President to exercise his
constitutional authority to fire his subordinates, thus politically disabling the
principle constitutional check on Executive Branch corruption. 4 If bad
apples are no longer accountable to the President through firing, what else
can be done, legally, to remedy corruption? One possible remedy may be the
Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence.
The hallmark of our status as a civilized society is due process, which
guarantees that the government must behave with "fundamental fairness"
before taking our life, liberty, or property. 85 Fundamental fairness, in turn,
means that the government cannot act "arbitrarily or capriciously" toward
us. 86 The means by which the government conducts itself matter deeply: the
government must respect the "decencies of civilized conduct. 87 It cannot
behave in ways that "shocks the conscience."88
criminal-justice-process (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
82. Id.
83.

See Carol D. Leonnig & Robert Costa, As Mueller Moves to Finalize

Obstruction Report, Trump's Allies Ready for PoliticalBattle, CHI. TRIB. (June 16,2018),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-mueer-trump-russia20180616-story.html.
84. See id.
85.

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

86. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Pitt v. Pine
Valley Golf Club, 695 F. Supp 778, 783 (D.N.J. 1988).
87. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,173 (1952).
88. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citing Rochin, 342
U.S. at 172-73) ("IFlor half a century now, we have spoken of the cognizable level of
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In Rochin v. California, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's
drug conviction, holding that the government's investigatory power is
constrained by due process:
It has long ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of
the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is
obtained.... [There is a] general requirement that the States in their
prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized conduct. 89 Due
process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than
to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend
"a sense of justice." 90
The Court concluded that forcibly pumping an individual's stomach to
look for evidence of illegal drugs offended a civilized society's sense of
justice and decency, and thus due process, because it shocks the conscience. 91
In United States v. Russell, the Supreme Court rejected a due process,
entrapment-based challenge to a drug conviction. 92 The defendant asserted
the police informant's act of supplying a scarce methamphetamine
ingredient violated fundamental fairness and, hence, due process.93 The
Supreme Court disagreed because the evidence demonstrated the defendant
successfully obtained the scarce ingredient both before and after law
enforcement supplied it, negating the possibility of entrapment. 14 The
Russell Court acknowledged, however, that the method or means by which
a prosecution emanates can, under the right set of facts, justify barring all
prosecution efforts:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction.., the instant case is distinctly not of
that breed.... The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of
violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
executive abuse of power [under the Due Process Clause] as that which shocks the
conscience.").
89. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73.
90. Id. at 173 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).

91. Id. at 172-73.
92. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430 (1973).

93. Id. at 427-28.
94. Id. at 431.
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justice," mandated
95
Amendment.

by

the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth

Given the right set of facts, therefore, the Russell Court believed due
process bars the use of all judicial processes arising from outrageous law
96
enforcement behavior.
One year after Russell, the Court's premonition came true. In
Blackledge v. Perry, the Court found that a prosecutor's potentially
vindictive conduct violated due process. 97 The defendant was charged with
misdemeanor assault, convicted at a bench trial, and received a six-month
sentence. 9 He filed a notice of appeal, which under North Carolina law
meant his earlier misdemeanor conviction was vacated, and a new de novo
trial was initiated. 99 Before the new trial began, however, the prosecutor
obtained an indictment charging the defendant with felony assault for the
same conduct. 101 The defendant pled guilty to the felony charge and received
a sentence of five to seven years. 10 1 He then petitioned for habeas corpus,
claiming the prosecutor's felony prosecution violated double jeopardy and
due process. 102
The Blackledge Court did not reach the double jeopardy question,
ruling instead that the prosecutor's conduct violated the Due Process
Clause. 103 Specifically, the Court believed the potential for prosecutorial
vindictiveness-even without evidence of any actual retaliatory motive4
tainted the prosecutorial effort sufficiently to violate due process.'0 In the
Court's words: "Due process of law requires that such a potential for
vindictiveness must not enter ... the process." 105 If there is a "realistic
likelihood of 'vindictiveness"' by a prosecutor, the Court said due process
requires invalidation of the prosecutorial effort.' 6 The right is a "right not
to be haled into court at all" because the "very initiation of the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
Id.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 23 (1974).
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25, 31.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 27.
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In Moran v. Burbine, the Supreme Court denied civil relief under
§ 1983 for a due process claim based on Rochin.08 In Moran, the plaintiff
alleged that police failed to inform him that an attorney, who had been
retained by his sister without his knowledge, was trying to reach him
and misled his attorney as to the plaintiff's whereabouts. 109 The Court
acknowledged that a Rochin claim could exist for "conduct of the police
[that] was so offensive as to deprive [defendant] of the fundamental fairness
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause." 1 0 But while the Court "share[d]
respondent's distaste for the deliberate misleading of an officer of the court,"
it did not desire to extend Miranda to require informing arrestees and their
attorneys of such information."' The Court declared:
We do not question that on facts more egregious than those presented
here police deception might rise to a level of a due process
violation.... We hold only that, on these facts, the challenged conduct
falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of
civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal
112
processes of the States.
Moran reconfirmed that a due process violation can occur when
investigators engage in fundamentally unfair behavior that shocks the
conscience."' It also indicates that the Court may hesitate to deem behavior
sufficiently conscience shocking when there are concerns about federalismi.e., "federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States."' 14 Such
federalism concerns would not be present, of course, in a due process
challenge to the Trump-Russia collusion investigation, which involves
behavior by federal, not state, investigatory officials.
107. Id. at 30-31.
108. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).

109. Moran, 475 U.S. at 417.
110. Id. at 432.
111. Id. at 424-25 ("The purpose of the Miranda warnings instead is to dissipate the
compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and, in so doing, guard against
abridgment of the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. Clearly, a rule that focuses on how

the police treat an attorney-conduct that has no relevance at all to the degree of
compulsion experienced by the defendant during interrogation-would ignore
both Miranda'smission and its only source of legitimacy.").

112. Id. at 432-33.
113. See id. at 433.
114. See id. at 433-34.
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In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Supreme Court
invalidated a district court's appointment of a special prosecutor to
prosecute contempt.115 The special prosecutor was a private attorney who
represented a client with a financial interest in the outcome of the contempt
prosecution.116 The Court observed that federal prosecutors exercise the
following forms of vast power and discretion:
[W]hich persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of
investigation should be used, what information will be sought as
evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which
persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea
bargains and the terms on which they will be11 7established, and whether
any individuals should be granted immunity.
These discretionary decisions are "made outside the supervision of the
court" and, consequently, necessitate that courts enforce "[t]he requirement
of a disinterested prosecutor" because otherwise, personal, financial, or
other interests "may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the
prosecutorial decision."'118
While seven Justices agreed that contempt proceedings must be
"conducted in a manner consistent with basic notions of fairness," including
disinterestedness, they concluded that this requirement should be enforced
via the Court's "supervisory authority." 19 Accordingly, although the
decision gives nod to concerns about fairness (and hence, due process), the
majority saw no need to constitutionalize its holding. 120 One Justice, Justice
Harry Blackmun, concurred separately to emphasize that the requirement
12
of disinterestedness is indeed of constitutional, due process dimension. 1
Most recently, in a pair of cases penned by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
the Supreme Court has concluded that potential bias by judges may
constitute a due process violation. In the first case, Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co., civil plaintiffs filed a motion asking a West Virginia Supreme
Court justice to recuse himself because the defendant coal company made
an independent campaign expenditure of $3 million supporting the justice's
115. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 791-92 (1987).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 807.
118. Id. at 807-08.
119. Id. at 808-09.
120. See id. at 815 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121. Id.
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re-election effort. 122 Subsequent to his election, the justice cast the deciding
vote in the court's decision to reverse a $50 million jury verdict against the
12
coal.company. '
The Supreme Court concluded due process was violated because,
under an objective assessment of the totality of the facts, there was a "risk
of actual bias or prejudgment" that rose to an unconstitutional level. 124 The
Court cited County of Sacramento v. Lewis-which itself relied on the
Rochin shocks the conscience standard 125-for the following proposition:
"[E]xtreme cases are more likely to cross constitutional limits, requiring this
Court's intervention and formulation of objective standards. This is
26
particularly true when due process is violated.'
Caperton's citation to the shocks the conscience standard and its
statement that "extreme facts" may cross the due process line, necessitating
Court intervention, suggest that the case is conceptually related to the
outrageousness and shocks the conscience line- of due process cases. 127
Whether one calls government action extreme, outrageous, fundamentally
unfair, or conscience shocking, all of these adjectives transgress the due
process -boundary and necessitate court remediation. 128
More recently, in Williams v. Pennsylvania,the Court again concluded
that due process was violated based on evidence of judicial bias. 129 The case
involved a habeas petition by an individual, Williams, who was convicted of
capital murder. 13 0 A lower Pennsylvania court granted a habeas petition
based on a Brady v. Maryland violation, granting a- stay of execution and a
new sentencing hearing. 131 The Commonwealth then submitted an
emergency application to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking to
vacate the stay of execution. 132 Williams filed a motion asking Chief Justice
Ronald Castille of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to recuse himself, as the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873-74 (2009).
Id. at 874-75.
Id. at 883-85.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887.
See id.
See id.
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1908-09 (2016).
Id. at 1904.
Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
Id.
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justice had been the district attorney who approved seeking the death
penalty in Williams's murder trial twenty-six years earlier. 133 The chief
justice refused to recuse himself, however, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
13 4
Court, with the chief justice's support, reinstated Williams's death penalty.
Williams argued that the justice's participation in reinstatement of his
death sentence violated due process because the justice's activities as district
attorney meant that he served as both an accuser and a judge in Williams's
case. 135 The Court agreed: "The Court now holds that under the Due Process
Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had
significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision
regarding the defendant's case." 136 The Court noted that "[d]ue process
guarantees 'an absence of actual bias' on the part of a judge" 137 and that the
constitutional guarantee is enforced by an objective standard in which the
"Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but
instead whether, as an objective matter, 'the average judge in his position is
"likely" to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for
bias.'"138

The Williams Court observed, "No attorney is more integral to the
accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary
decision."' 39 And while numerous other individuals were involved in the
prosecution against Mr. Williams and six other justices sat on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this did not vitiate the concern about due
process:
The involvement of other actors and the passage of time are
consequences of a complex criminal justice system, in which a single
case may be litigated through multiple proceedings taking place over a
period of years. This context only heightens the need for objective rules
preventing the operation of bias that otherwise might be obscured.
Within a large, impersonal system, an individual prosecutor might still
have an influence that, while not so visible ... is nevertheless

133.

Id.

134. Id. at 1904-05.
135.
136.

Id. at 1905.
Id.

137. Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
138. Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009))

(quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 1906.
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significant. A prosecutor may bear responsibility for any number of
critical decisions, including what charges to bring, whether to extend a
plea bargain, and which witnesses to call. 14°
The involvement of numerous other actors did not relieve the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court chief justice of his constitutional, due processbased obligation to recuse himself.' 4 ' His failure to do so constituted a
"structural error" of fundamental unfairness that was not amenable to
harmless error analysis. 142 The Court believed:
[T]he appearance of bias demeans the reputation and integrity not just
of one jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or she is a
part.... Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are
necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus
143
to the rule of law itself.
Case-by-case adjudication of due process claims requires great
sensitivity to the facts. 144 But when the facts indicate investigative or
prosecutorial behavior is outrageous or conscience shocking-including the
reasonable potential for bias or vindictiveness--due process provides a
meaningful judicial remedy. 45 It should be recognized, however, that what
may be outrageous or conscience-shocking bias for a judge may not be
46
outrageous or conscience-shocking bias for a prosecutor or investigator.1
Indeed, seven Justices in Young acknowledged "[t]he requirement of a
disinterested prosecutor is consistent with our recognition that prosecutors
may not necessarily be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as
judges" because prosecutors are expected to be "permitted to be zealous in
their enforcement of the law"'147 and thus biased against the accused in a way
that would be "intolerable" for a judge. 148 Moreover, ordinarily courts "can

140. Id. at 1906-07.
141. Id. at 1907.
142. Id. at 1909.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1902.
145. See, e.g., id. at 1905-06.
146. See, e.g., id.
147. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987)
(citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980)).
148. Id. (citing Marshall,446 U.S. at 250-52).
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only speculate whether other interests are likely to influence an enforcement
1 49
officer."'
This does not mean, however, that prosecutorial or investigatory bias
may never be sufficiently outrageous or conscience shocking enough to cross
the due process line, as demonstrated by Blackledge. 150 When the facts
indicate investigators or prosecutors have used their vast power to pursue a
biased, vindictive, or corrupt agenda rather than pursue justice, the judicial
conscience may indeed be shocked. Indeed, the Young Court stated that
where there is "no need to speculate whether the prosecutor will be subject
to extraneous influence"-such as a professional or financial bias against the
accused-the requirement of a disinterested prosecutor, and thus due
process, is violated.1 51 The Blackledge decision bolsters this impression. Due
process was violated in Blackledge by a prosecution that, under the
circumstances, reasonably appeared vindictive. 152 The Court noted that
previous decisions had found due process violations based on "apprehension
of.. . a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge" and
to a charge
concluded that it was "clear that the same considerations apply"
153
prosecutors.
against
levied
impropriety
of due process-level
In addition, an early Supreme Court case, Berger v. United States,
acknowledges that prosecutors have an obligation to carry out their duties
impartially:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party.., but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.... It is as much his duty to refrain from
as it is
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
15 4
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Presumably, the obligation to carry out duties impartially includes a
lack of biased or vindictive motivations and extends to all members of an
investigative or prosecutorial team.5 5 Behavior that reasonably appears to
149. Id.
150. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974).

151. Young, 481 U.S. at 807-08.
152. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28.
153. Id. at 28.

154. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
155. See id.
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be motivated by bias or vindictiveness crosses the constitutional line
precisely because it shocks the conscience of a civilized society, which
rightfully demands that prosecutions be initiated based on evidence of a
156
crime, not animus against the accused.
It should also be noted that under the rationale of Williams,
conscience-shocking behavior by just one individual can taint the entire
prosecutorial effort, even if numerous other officials involved did nothing
wrong.157 Thus, even assuming arguendo that Special Counsel Mueller's
investigatory team itself has no conscience-shocking bias or other behavior,
this should not remove the taint of unconstitutionality imposed by
antecedent FBI investigators. If conscience-shocking behavior by executive
officials is to be effectively deterred, it cannot be laundered by passing the
investigative buck to others. Conscience-shocking, antecedent behavior of
investigative officers, in other words, may rot the foundation upon which
Special Counsel Mueller's investigation rests.
This is as it should be: Corruption corrodes democracy. It cannot be
tolerated in a civilized society. Corruption is especially pernicious in those
who wield the awesome power of investigating and prosecuting crimes.
III. CONCLUSION

The vast power of investigators and prosecutors must be effectively
checked, either by the power to fire them or by judicial enforcement of the
outer boundaries of acceptable behavior under the Due Process Clause.
Because the potential to wield investigative and prosecutorial power for
political gain is far too tempting, judicially enforceable limits to the manner
in which such power is exercised are needed, particularly when the prize is
the power flowing from the U.S. Presidency. When an abuse of investigative
power potentially culminates in the appointment of a special prosecutor to
investigate the President, the risk to democracy is one hundred-fold greater.
As the history of independent and special prosecutors has shown, the
ineluctable inclination of such prosecutors is to leverage their independence
and vast power to bring down the President and effectively overturn his
election.
Justice Robert Jackson knew a little something about the risk of
investigative and prosecutorial corruption. He was a U.S. attorney, the
156.
157.

See id.; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1908-09 (2016).
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Solicitor General, the Attorney General, a Supreme Court Justice, and chief
counsel at the Nuremburg Trials. 158 In 1940, while serving as Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's Attorney General, Justice Jackson reminded a group of
U.S. attorneys something fundamental about the nature of their duty and
due process:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can
choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. With the law books filled
with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of
finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost
anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission
of a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a
question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting
investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm-in
which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to
embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks
for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power
lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real
crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or
governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or being
personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself. 15 9
Justice Jackson's words ring true today. Justice Jackson was of course
focusing on ordinary investigators and prosecutors. But the harms he
identified are heightened when the prosecutor is an "independent" or
"special" prosecutor. If the American people are angered by corrupt or
biased behavior of an ordinary prosecutor, the President can fire him or
choose not to fire him and bear the brunt of the people's ire come election
1 61
day. 16 The political buck, in other words, will stop with the President.
158. Robert H. Jackson, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Robert-H-Jackson (last updated Sept. 4, 2018).
159. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor,24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 18,

19 (1940), https://www.roberthjackson.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/O1/TheFederalProsecutor.pdf.
160. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 49293 (2010).
161. See id. ("The landmark case of Myers v. United States reaffirmed the principle

that Article II confers on the President the 'general administrative control of those
executing the laws.' It is his responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. The buck stops with the President, in Harry Truman's famous phrase. As we
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But who is to blame when an independent or special counsel goes
rogue? Whom do the people vote out of office then? Justice Antonin Scalia
once put it this way in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson:
The mini-Executive that is the independent counsel.., operating in an
area where so little is law and so much is discretion, is intentionally cut
off from.., the perspective that multiple responsibilities provide. What
would normally be regarded as a technical violation (there are no rules
defining such things), may in his or her small world assume the
proportions of an indictable offense. What would normally be regarded
as an investigation that has reached the level of pursuing such picayune
matters that it should be concluded, may to him or her be an
investigation that ought to go on for another year. How frightening it
must be to have your own independent counsel and staff appointed, with
nothing else to do but to investigate.., until investigation is no longer
worthwhile ....
How admirable the constitutional system that provides
the means to avoid such a distortion. And how unfortunate the judicial
decision that has permitted it.162
As this quote from Justice Scalia's dissent indicates, the majority in
Morrison upheld the old independent counsel statute. 163 Whether the
14
current Supreme Court would continue to abide by Morrison is in doubt.'
But whatever the case, for present purposes it is important to
remember that the political nature of independent counsel investigations
ultimately caused deep anger on both sides of the aisle. Republicans
were unhappy with the Iran-Contra investigation led by Lawrence Walsh. 16 5
Democrats were unhappy with the Whitewater investigation led by Ken

explained in Myers, the President therefore must have some 'power of removing those
for whom he can not continue to be responsible."' (quoting Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 164 (1926)).
162. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 659-60 (majority opinion).
164. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, LAWFARE (June 9,
2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.comlmorrison-v-olson-bad-law.
165.

PBS

See Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law,
FRONTLINE,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel!office/

history.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) ("In December of 1992, the independent counsel
law expired in the face of a Republican filibuster. In so doing, it drew a brief round of
cheers from long-time skeptics and the law's other enemies, who continued to denounce
the supposed excesses of the Iran-Contra investigation.").
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ultimately led to the House impeachment of President
Starr (which
Clinton). a66
Congress consequently let the independent counsel statute lapse in
In its place, we now have special counsel regulations issued by the
Department of Justice. 168 As regulations, they could be rescinded or even
ignored by any president who so desired.1 69 And I have serious doubts about
the ability of any Executive Branch department or agency to "self-entrench"
170
one of its officers by regulation, making them fire-able only for good cause.
But assuming arguendo these special counsel regulations are followed, they
were-at least in theory--designed to be "better" than the old independent
counsel statute. Under the special counsel regulations, the lines of political
accountability to the President are supposedly stronger with special counsel
being an officer of the Department of Justice who is directly accountable 17to1
the Attorney General, who is in turn directly accountable to the President.
1999.167

But if the Attorney General recuses himself and cries of obstruction fill
the air whenever whispers of firing the special counsel are overheard, the
lines of political accountability become, pragmatically, just as blurred as with

166. See Tucker Carlson, Trashing Kenneth Starr, WKLY. STANDARD (June 29,
1998), https://www.weeklystandard.com/tucker-carlson/trashing-kenneth-starr.
167. Helen Dewar, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST
(June 5, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/
counse1060599.htm.
168. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1-.10 (2001).
169. See CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857,
SPECIAL COUNSELS, INDEPENDENT COUNSELS AND SPECIAL PROSECUTORS: LEGAL
AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS ON INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 22

(2018) ("[I]t is uncertain to what extent the regulations ultimately constrain the
executive branch. Because no statute appears to require the Department to promulgate
regulations concerning a special counsel, the Department likely enjoys discretion to
repeal them.").
170. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) ("The Attorney General may remove a Special
Counsel for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other
good cause, including violation of Departmental policies.").
171. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT
COUNSELS, SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

3-4 (2013) ("[S]pecial counsels are appointed by, are answerable to, and may have their
prosecutorial or investigative decisions countermanded by, the Attorney General. The
'special counsels' under these regulations have, therefore, by express design, less
'independence' from the Attorney General and the Department of Justice than did the
'independent counsels' under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, or the 'special
prosecutors' appointed by the Attorney General for the Watergate matter.").
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the old independent counsel law. We are right back where we started: we
have a politically insulated prosecutor with virtually unlimited authority to
target a President and his associates for acts undertaken both before and
72
after his assumption of the Presidency.
This is not healthy for a constitutional republic and separation of
powers. It was not healthy in Iran-Contra. 173 It was not healthy in
Whitewater. 174 And it is not healthy now. It feeds partisanship, like throwing
chum in the water for political sharks who care more about party than
country. It creates deep political resentments that fester and foster dreams
of revenge.
We knew all this in 1999 when Congress let the independent counsel
statute lapse. 175 Back then, we seemed to have burned each political side
enough that we learned our lessons about allowing prosecutors to have so
much power, unchecked by the political process. 176 Unfortunately, our
political divisions have grown since 1999,177 and the appetite for consuming
a Presidency has grown commensurately.
There are those who believe the ends justify the means-that ending
the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, or (now) Donald Trump is
a noble goal 178 that warrants open opposition to, or distortion of, the
Constitution. 179 But if we bend it too much, it is going to eventually break.
172. Compare id. at 6-7 (illustrating the removal process and authority of
independent counsel), with id. at 11-12, 14 (explaining the removal process and authority
of special counsel).
173. See generally Mokhiber, supra note 165 (criticizing the Iran-Contra
investigation).
174. See id. (describing seven separate investigations of the Clinton Administration).
175. See MASKELL, supra note 171, at 2-3.

176. See Mokhiber, supra note 165 (stating that in 1998 the law was losing "key
political and public support").
177. See, e.g., Carroll Doherty, Key Takeaways on Americans' Growing Partisan
Divide over Political Values, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/ 2017/10/05/takeaways-on-americans-growing-partisan-divide-over-politicalvalues/ ("Across 10 political values Pew Research Center has tracked since 1994, there
is now an average 36-percentage-point gap between Republicans and Republicanleaning independents and Democrats and Democratic leaners. In 1994, it was only 15
points.").
178. See, e.g., Zachary Warmbrodt, Waters Scares Democrats with Call for All-Out
War on Trump, POLITICO (June 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/25/

maxine-waters-democrats-reaction-trump-feud-648028.
179.

See, e.g., David S. Cohen, Will Electors Vote Their Conscience & Prevent a
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And if we love our country, we must elevate means over ends. That is what
due process is all about.

Trump Presidency?, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.coml
politics/politics-features/will-electors-vote-their-conscience-and-prevent-a-trumppresidency-107863/ (documenting democratic efforts to convince electors to be
faithless); Ross Douhat, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendmenttrump.html (asserting in the fourth month of the Trump Administration that the
President should be removed under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because he is "unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office"); Editorial, Let the People Pick the
President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/opinion/
elections-electoral-college-voting.html (arguing that the electoral college should be
repealed).
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